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PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
WHITEHEAD AND HUME ON INDUCTION 
Marvin E. Kanne 
Department of Philosophy 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
Lincoln, Nebraska 68588 
While modem science has made important contributions to the 
advance of learning, Hume has pointed out that a crucial element of its 
methodology is seriously flawed. His analysis concluded that there is 
no rational justification for inductive reasoning. Viewed from another 
perspective, the point of Hume's criticism would seem to be that the 
scientist's faith in the order of nature is without any ground in nature. 
Whitehead found Hume's analysis to be profoundly unsettling be-
cause it leads to such utter skepticism. Whitehead believed the key to 
induction is to be found in the right understanding of the immediate 
occasion of knowledge in its full concreteness. If one turns to exper-
ience in all of its fullness, then it will be seen that Hume's analysis 
deals only in abstract considerations and not in the concrete occasions 
of experience. 
By returning to the immediate occasion of experience Whitehead 
believed that the essential relatedness of nature will be discovered. 
It is this relatedness, which is discovered in our pre-analytic knowledge, 
that provides the ground for our faith in the order of nature and 
justifies inductive reasoning. 
t t t 
Francis Bacon was among the first to realize explicitly 
the antithesis between deductive rationalism of the medieval 
scholastics and inductive observational methods of the mod-
erns. However, induction proved to be somewhat more com-
plex than Bacon had anticipated. He felt that if sufficient care 
were taken in the collection of cases the general law itself 
would stand out. Later scientific investigations have revealed 
that this is an inadequate account of the procedures which 
issue in scientific generalizations. Nevertheless, Bacon was one 
of the prophets of the historical revolt, which overturned the 
method of rationalism, and rushed to the opposite extreme, 
which held that all fruitful knowledge was based upon in-
f~rence from particular instances in the past to particular 
hstances in the future (Whitehead, 1925 :44-45). 
It was Hume's (in Selby-Bigge, 1888:139 and 1902: 
(;3, 72-79) good fortune to show that such an unguarded 
conception of induction would lead to totally unwarranted 
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conclusions. Adopting the empirical method of the modern 
scientists, Hume indicated that knowledge of the world could 
be no more than phenomenalistic. That is, if our experience is 
stringently limited to appearances, we can draw no conclu-
sion beyond these appearances. As a result of Hume's criti-
cism, one of the unsolved problems bequeathed to us by the 
17th century is the rational justification of inductive reason-
ing. If this problem did not lead us to an utter scepticism, it 
would not be so urgent and unsettling: "Either there is some-
thing about the immediate occasion which affords knowledge 
of the past and future, or we are reduced to utter scepticism 
as to memory and induction" (Whitehead, 1925:46). 
Whitehead (1925:46) believed that " ... the key to the 
process of induction, as used either in science or in our ordi-
nary life, is to be found in the right understanding of the 
immediate occasion of knowledge in its full concreteness." 
Our difficulties arise when we substitute for the concrete 
occasion an abstract consideration in which we attend only 
to material objects as fluctuating configurations in space and 
time. So abstracted, objects reveal only their positions, dis-
closing nothing of their mutual dependencies. Accordingly, 
we must observe the immediate occasion and use reason to 
discover a general description of its nature. 
Both Hume and Whitehead started their arguments from 
experience; where did the Humean analysis go astray? First, 
Whitehead denied Hume's view of experience as a mere succes-
sion of loose events. That is, Whitehead denied that the im-
mediately given of experience is sensory atoms. But more 
basically, a false assumption underlies Hume's approach to 
immediate experience. 
This assumption underlies the whole philosophy of nature 
during the modern period. It is grounded in the answer that 
the 17th century philosophers gave to the Ionian thinkers' 
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questions, "What is the world made of?" Their answer was 
that the world is a succession of instantaneous configurations 
of matter or material (Whitehead, 1925: 51). Science rested 
content with this assumption as to the fundamental elements 
of nature, for the great forces of nature were determined by 
the configurations of masses. These configurations determined 
their own changes, completely closing the circle of scientific 
thought. This mechanistic theory justified itself by the prag-
matic test. 
If this mechanistic materialism is accepted, i. e., if there is 
a presupposition of nature at a point-instant (as Newtonian 
science presumed), then causality is, as Hume pointed out, 
merely a "habit" or "custom" with no counterpart in nature. 
However, such a theory involves the error of mistaking the 
abstract for the concrete. It is an example of what Whitehead 
(1925 :52) called the "Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness." 
More specifically it involves setting up distinctions which dis-
regard the genuine interconnections of things. Due to "Mis-
placed Concreteness" the real continuity of experience is 
atomized, and temporal duration is denied. 
More specifically, what is entailed is a sub-fallacy of Mis-
placed Concreteness: the concept of simple location. By 
simple location Whitehead (1925: 50) meant " ... one major 
characteristic which refers equally both to space and to time, 
and other minor characteristics which are diverse as between 
space and time." The fallacy of simple location occurs when it 
is assumed that in expressing the space and time relations of a 
bit of material, it is unnecessary to say more than it is present 
at a specific point in space at a specific instant of time. "The 
characteristic common both to space and time is that material 
can be said to be here in space and here in time, or here in 
space-time, in a perfectly definite sense which does not re-
quire for its explanation any reference to other regions of 
space-time" (Whitehead, 1925:50). Once it is determined 
what is meant by definite place, the relation of a specific ma-
terial bit to space and time can be adequately stated by saying 
that it is simply in that place, and there is nothing more to 
be stated regarding that particular bit of matter. 
Regarding the minor characteristics which were men-
tioned above, Whitehead undertook some subordinate explana-
tions. With respect to time, dividing the time does not divide 
the material that existed in a longer period of time. However, 
with respect to space, dividing the volume does divide the 
material that existed previously in the undivided volume of 
space. That is, if material exists throughout a volume, there 
will be less of that material distributed throughout any given 
portion of that volume. Such considerations lead Whitehead 
(1925: 51) to the interesting conclusion that the lapse of time 
is accidental, rather than essential to the character of the 
material. The material is equally itself at any instant of time, 
or any sub-period of that instant. 
If the concept of simple location is held, difficulties arise 
immediately. If a material configuration has no inherent rela-
tion or reference to configurations in any other times, past or 
future, it immediately follows that nature within any period is 
not connected to nature in any other time, that nature is, as 
Hume's analysis draws out, "loose and separate." If there is no 
inherent reference, Hume's "external objects" offer no ground 
for the justification of inductive reasoning. Consequently, 
Hume was correct: the only alternative for grounding induc-
tive reasoning is the mind. If there is no basis in nature for any 
justification of the order nature displays, this order must be 
mind-imposed since in reality it is mind-based. That is, the 
consistent contiguity and temporal succession observed in 
nature are in reality a random sense manifold; and, since we 
observe no necessary connection or power in nature itself, the 
order of nature is really the order of mind. 
By accepting mechanistic materialism, which was the basis 
of Galilean-Copernican-Newtonian universe, Hume brought 
about a unique turn of events for empiricism, especially a 
highly empirical scientific methodology. If one of the aims of 
science is projection (i.e., prediction either into the future or 
the past), mechanistic materialism's fallacy of simple location 
prohibits this attempt. Since material configurations lack 
inherent reference, there is nothing in the present observed 
nature that could possiblY enable the scientist to project either 
to composition of past configurations or future configurations. 
The most he could do is consider nature at the present, cata-
loguing his observations of the present from instant to instant. 
Any projection beyond the present would be futile guesswork, 
since the observed present has no inherent reference to any 
unobserved future or past. At best there could be an accidental 
relationship between the observed and unobserved. But an 
accidental relationship in nature would not offer any basis for 
a legitimate scientific knowledge of the physical world, since 
our knowledge of nature would be as random as the occasional 
relationships. In brief, when Hume accepted mechanistic 
materialism, his analysis poignantly pointed out that one 
could not go beyond what Whitehead (1925:52) was later to 
call the fallacy of the simple location of here and now. Conse-
quently, insofar as a scientific methodology is based on this 
fallacy, it is bound to a succession of present here and now's. 
Inasmuch as mechanistic materialism passed the pragmatic 
test, it has been highly successful. Philosophically speaking, 
however, it posed an insurmountable obstacle, and "the only 
wonder is that the world did in fact wait for Hume before 
noting the difficulty." The point of Hume's analysis, then, 
would seem to be that scientists' simple faith in the order of 
nature was without any ground in nature. 
Having just seen that Hume's challenge is unanswerable, 
if we grant his premise of mechanistic materialism, we can see 
that Whitehead was forced to return to a new analysis of 
nature, if he were to remain empirical and yet justify inductive 
reasoning. In analyzing our immediate experience, Whitehead 
(1925:57) found that among the primary elements of nature 
as apprehended, there is no element whatever which possesses 
this character of simple location. 
Whitehead argued that Hume, by neglecting the causal 
mode of perception, missed the essential relatedness of things, 
and by missing the essential relatedness of things, slipped into 
sceptism. According to Whitehead (1927: 17), in our exper-
ience we discern two distinct modes of direct perception of 
the external world: perception in the mode of causal efficacy 
and perception in the mode of presentational immediacy. 
When a person vaguely prehends data, which are felt as coming 
into the experience of the subject from the past, through the 
mediation of the body, this is causal efficacy (Whitehead, 
1929: 184, 189, 266-267). (Whitehead also discerned in a 
mbject's experience a vague feeling of "on-going" toward 
[he future.) Presentational immediacy, on the other hand, is 
ill experience of clear-cut sense data definitely located, with 
,ill emphasis on the present and a minimum of reference to 
:Jast or future (Whitehead, 1927:13-29 and 1929:185,271). 
There is a close relation between these two modes of per-
.:eption. The sense data of presentational immediacy are 
derived from the data of causal efficacy. A Significant change 
m the characteristics of these data occurs in this derivation. 
In the mode of presentational immediacy what (in causal 
efficacy) was vague in quality and function becomes clear and 
distinct (Whitehead, 1929:262). For example, a subject vague-
ly experiences pain as derived from the body. This perception 
i, in the mode of causal efficacy. When this pain is clearly 
apprehended as localized, there is perception in the mode of 
r resentational immediacy. Hence, the later mode of percep-
Lon is found only in organisms of a high grade (Whitehead, 
] 929:261). 
Since data in the mode of presentational immediacy are 
ciear and distinct, it is this mode of perception that is the 
b [sis of all exact measurements (Whitehead, 1929:197-499). 
Vhitehead granted the importance of this mode of perception; 
h lwever, he also offered very vigorous criticisms of this 
e: sentially abstract approach to the complex of environment. 
IJ presentational immediacy (or, to speak less technically, in 
o dinary sense experience), there is a tendency to assign exces-
si,ce importance to clear-cut and apparently unrelated bits of 
St'1se data. According to Whitehead (1929:263), this is precise-
ly what Hume did, for in Hume's theory response is to pre-
St '1tational immediacy and nothing else. 
Whitehead contended, contrary to Hume, that there can 
bt an impression of causality. For example, when a bright 
!ifht is presented as a stimulus, a man blinks. In the terms of 
H:.~ mode of presentational immediacy the sequence of the 
p( 'cepts is: flash of light, feeling of eye-closure, and instant 
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darkness. Although these three percepts are practically simul-
taneous, the flash maintains its priority over the other two; 
and the priority of the last two percepts is indistinguishable. 
In Whitehead's philosophy of organism, the man also exper-
iences another percept in the mode of causal efficacy. "He 
feels that the experiences of the eye in the matter of the flash 
are causal of the blink" (Whitehead, 1929:265). The man who 
experiences this does not doubt it. Actually, it is the very 
feeling of causality which enables the man to distinguish the 
priority of the flash over the blink and instant darkness. If 
asked why he blinked, the man will reply, "The flash made me 
blink." And, if asked how he knows this, he will reply, "I 
know it, because I felt it." 
Whitehead's view differed from Hume's here because he 
accepted the man's statement. Hume, however, would have 
stated that in our perception (Whitehead's mode of presenta-
tional immediacy) there is found no percept of flash causing 
the man to blink. In our experience there are simply the two 
percepts: the flash and the blink. Hume refused to admit the 
datum that the compulsion to blink was indeed felt by the 
man. Whitehead contended that Hume could not admit this 
datum, because he was correct that there is no such datum in 
his view of percepts. Whitehead replied, however, that our 
view of percepts must be broadened to take in such a percept 
as "cause." Hume would have interpreted that what the man 
really felt was his habit of blinking after flashes and not 
causality. Whitehead (1929:266), then, asked Hume: 
But how can a "habit" be felt, when a "cause" can-
not be felt? Is there any presentational immediacy 
in the feeling of a "habit"? ... by a sleight of hand 
[you] confuse a "habit of feeling blinks after flashes" 
with a ''feeling of the habit of feeling blinks after 
flashes." 
The notion of causality did not arise from clear and distinct 
impressions of experience, but rather because man experiences 
in the mode of causal efficacy. 
By presentational immediacy we are made aware of the 
observed world as illustrated and made vivid by certain sensa. 
While in this mode, we discern no referential qualities, and we 
merely see the sensa disposed in a particular manner. Hume 
took presentational immediacy to be the primary fact in per-
ception, and he held that whatever is to be posited in the 
perceived world should be derivable from this fact. In oppo-
sition to this view, Whitehead held causal efficacy is more 
fundamental than presentational immediacy. In fact, as was 
pointed out above, causal efficacy is at the root of all our 
objective experience. This mode can actually be called causal 
feeling (Das, 1938:132). 
Because they have not properly considered the real char-
acter of time, philosophers have found it easy to overlook 
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the feeling of causal efficacy. Time is primarily recognized as 
the succession of our acts or experience, and derivatively as 
the succession of events objectively perceived in those acts. 
However, there is no such a thing as mere succession. Accord-
ing to Whitehead (1925: 52), Bergson rightly called this a dis-
tortion of nature due to the intellectual "spatialization" of 
things. In the concrete, succession is the conformation of one 
event to another, of the later to the earlier. There is no such 
thing as the lapse of empty time, but only a succession of 
events, which· means that every event is derived from its pre-
decessor to which it conforms in some fashion. The flow of 
time is really the causal flow of events, in which the later 
events must conform to earlier ones. Time is irreversible 
(Das, 1938:134). When one considers the idea of empty time, 
mere succession, he is considering an abstraction from the 
concrete fact of immediate experience. This is an error, an 
accidental error of mistaking the abstract for the concrete 
(Whitehead,I925:52). 
The feeling of causal efficacy, although deep and ines-
capable, and heavy with emotion, fails to capture its due 
measure of recognition, because our attention is held by the 
clarity and distinctness of what we get in the mode of presen-
tational immediacy. Because this clarity and distinctness cap-
tured Hume's attention, he took presentational immediacy to 
be the only mode of perception. Taking presentational imme-
diacy as the only mode of perception, he priorly assumed that 
time is pure succession. That is, if one assumes that time is 
pure succession, one will consequently take presentational 
immediacy to be primary in perception. As noted above, to 
take time as pure succession is an example of the fallacy of 
Misplaced Concreteness. 
How is this so? The notion of pure succession is analo-
gous to a notion of color. In our concrete, immediate exper-
ience we never discover mere color, but always a red or blue 
and so on. Analogously, we never discern pure succession, 
" ... but always some particular relational ground in respect 
to which of the terms succeed each other" (Whitehead, 1927: 
35). Integers succeed one another in one way, and events 
succeed each other in another way. When these ways of suc-
cession are abstracted, it is discovered that pure succession is 
an abstraction of the second order. That is, we have a generic 
abstraction omitting the temporal character of time and 
numerical relation of integers. In our concrete, immediate ex-
perience, time is known to us as the succession of our acts of 
experience. And, as indicated above, this succession is not 
pure succession, but rather it is the derivation of state from 
state, with the later state exhibiting a conformity to the ante-
cedent. In reality time is experienced as the conformation of 
state to state, the later conforming to the earlier. Pure suc-
cession, then, is an abstraction from the irreversible relation-
ship of settled past to derivative present (Whitehead, 1927: 
35). The past consists of a community of settled acts which, 
insofar as they are objectified in the present act, set the 
conditions to which that act must conform (Whitehead, 
1927:36). 
Employing Aristotlian terms, Whitehead (1927:36) wrote: 
... we say that the limitations of pure potentiality, 
established by "objectifications" of the settled past, 
expresses that "natural potentiality" -or, potentiality 
in nature - which is "matter" with that basis of ini-
tial, realized form presupposed as the first phase in 
the self-creation of the present occasion. The notion 
of "pure potentiality" here takes the place of Aris-
totle's "matter," and "natural potentiality" is "mat-
ter" with that given imposition of form from which 
each actual thing arises. 
The constitutive elements which are given for experience can 
be found by analyzing natural potentiality. The immediate 
present, then, must conform to what the past is for it (White-
head, 1927 :36), and pure succession is an abstraction from the 
more concrete relatedness of conformation. The substantial 
character of actual things expresses the stubborn fact that 
whatever is actually determined must be conformed to by the 
determinable present. In other words, the unobserved must 
conform to the observed in some degree. (The phrase "in some 
degree" is used designedly here, for there is novelty in the un-
observed.) According to Hume, there are no stubborn facts of 
immediate experience, for it is "habit" or "custom" alone that 
remains recalcitrant when all is said and done. To conclude, 
let us quote Whitehead (1927:37): 
Hume's doctrine may be good philosophy, but it is 
certainly not common sense. In other words, it fails 
the final test of obvious verification. 
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